By Leo
Donofrio
March 3, 2009
http://naturalborncitizen.wordpress.com/
I'm publishing
my research and
analysis with the hope it will do some good. I can't promise I'll take
it any further than that. But anybody is free to copy this research
word for word and do with it what they like. If I feel inspired by
the response, and enough people come forward and express a belief in me
and my work, I might draft a petition for quo warranto on their
behalf. I will not be soliciting any clients. I'd rather have
fun.
But the Constitution matters more than fun. We'll see what
happens.
CHANGES BELOW IN RED.]
Today I had a
five hour meeting with New Jersey attorney, Mario
Apuzzo. The meeting was entirely focused on the issue of Quo Warranto.
Bottom line:
we’ve
identified a subset of plaintiffs who have a much more viable path to
standing to institute an action in Quo Warranto than active military.
This subset of plaintiffs would not be exposed to possible court
martial since they are not military plaintiffs. And there is no
prevailing need to place this burden on the backs of our military. Our military can retreat in peace
on this issue. There is a new hope with a greater chance of
success. This new hope has several layers of possibility. Attorney Apuzzo and I will be
joining forces to see this matter receives the attention of proper
Government officials.
I contacted
Mario after both reading his pleadings in the Kerchner v. Obama case,
and listening
to his interviews. I was impressed by the level of detail his
pleadings brought forth.
The intelligence and passion for the Constitution shown by Mr. Apuzzo
and his plaintiff, Mr. Kerchner, are evident in the interviews they
have given. They both recognize that the main issue is centered on
Obama being a British Subject and that the birth certificate issue,
while important, is ancillary to Obama’s admission that the
British
Nationality Act of 1948 governed his birth status regardless of whether
he was born in Hawaii.
They plead their
case as to both issues and they did so in an original and convincing
matter.
I have also
heard them discuss John McCain shamefully allowing the
myth to circulate that he was born on a military installation while his
birth certificate and COLB both state he was born in Colon Hospital,
Panama and not on a military base (which wouldn’t have qualified him
anyway according to the State Department Foreign Affairs Manual and
various case law).
Having respect
for Mr. Apuzzo’s work, and knowing that he had
brought one count in a complaint for Quo Warranto on behalf of Mr.
Kerchner et al., I felt the need to share and discuss my research with
Mario.
I
respect Mr. Apuzzo’s efforts and felt we could possibly
team up to both educate the public as well as educate other counsel
while saving our military the trouble of being unnecessarily subjected
to court martial.
I am very happy to report to
you that Mr. Apuzzo and I have come to an agreement and we will be attempting to put the Quo Warranto issue squarely before
the two people in our national government who have the statutory
authority to request Obama substantiate his eligibility and to have a
federal court determine whether Obama’s birth, subject to the British
Nationality Act of 1948 disqualifies him to be POTUS.
Those two
officials are not in the subset of plaintiffs I discussed above. As is designated by
statute, both Attorney General Eric Holder and Jeffrey Taylor, US
Attorney for the District of Columbia, may institute an action in Quo
Warranto upon their own motion in the name of the United States. In
fact, as per the relevant SCOTUS case law, while the decision to bring
such an action is entirely in their discretion, both appear to have an
ethical duty to bring such an action at this time.
The statute
requires any such action be instituted in the District
Court for the District of Columbia. SCOTUS is not the proper venue to
initially bring this action. The statute is very clear as to the
DC
District Court venue.
Furthermore,
should either official institute an action in Quo
Warranto on their own behalf, they may do so without leave of the
court. If they do institute such an action, the issue must be brought to a hearing and determined on the merits. The statute
grants the AG and US Attorney undeniable power and respect on this
issue.
If AG Holder and
US Attorney Taylor refuse to institute an action in Quo Warranto on
their own motion,
the same statute provides for all “third persons” (any citizen) to
request, via verified petition, that either of those two officials
institute an action in Quo Warranto on plaintiffs’ behalf, subject to
leave of the District Court of DC.
If AG Holder and
US Attorney Taylor refuse to bring the action on
their own motion, Mario Apuzzo and I are committed to acquiring as
large a set of plaintiffs as possible to petition these officials on
plaintiffs’ behalf [but in separate law suits]. “Third persons” are any citizens of the United
States.
If the officials
refuse consent to bring the action “ex relator” on
behalf of such “third persons”, then the statute provides that any
“interested persons” (a subset of “third persons”) may petition
the
court without the consent of the two officials. It is the SCOTUS
definition of “interested persons” that helped us identify the
subset
referred to above.
SCOTUS has
stated that the civil service laws might provide Quo
Warranto standing to some plaintiffs. For example, SCOTUS case
law and
various Federal District and Court of Appeals cases, indicate that any
Government employee who loses their job by RIF (reduction in force)
employment termination might have standing to institute an action in
Quo Warranto.
While AG Eric
Holder might appear to have a conflict of interest
since he was appointed by Obama, Jeffrey Taylor certainly has no
conflict of interest as he was appointed by the Bush administration.
Regardless, Eric Holder should still be given the opportunity
to do the right thing. I do not believe it is correct to ask him
to recuse himself unless he refuses to bring an action for Quo Warranto.
Furthermore,
the first attempt to raise the issue with both
Attorney General Holder and US Attorney Taylor should be on behalf of
the United States and not in relation to any plaintiffs.
I am in the
process of writing a full legal brief on this issue.
I’ve seen the statute mentioned and included in some pleadings. I’ve
also seen a few references to relevant cases. But in order for lay
people to understand the nuances of the law, these references need to
be carefully explained in easy to understand terms. By doing so, I
will provide clear understanding as to why the military do not need to
take this battle on.
Both Attorney
Apuzzo and I expect other plaintiffs with tighter
standing will come forth as this information is made clear to the
public. We imagine that as Obama cuts programs and institutes federal
salary caps, various plaintiffs will emerge who have better claims to
standing. Of course we believe this action should be brought
asap, but it’s even more important to get the public clearly educated
as to the law and public policy concerns.
It would be best
for the nation if AG Holder or US Attorney Taylor
do this on their own volition and motion. The issue of Obama’s
eligibility for POTUS has already spread so far and wide from
mainstream media to tabloids and foreign news coverage and it’s not
going away. Furthermore, our military are subjecting themselves
to
court martial. A genuine controversy exists that should be settled by
the federal statue which provides clearly for the disposition of just
such a fact pattern.
Mr. Apuzzo and I
decided it’s best that this research be published
far and wide and also included in a letter to AG Holder and US Attorney
Taylor suggesting they institute an action for Quo Warranto on their
own motion. This
requires no plaintiffs.
A general
petition containing the names of as many potential
ordinary citizens as possible will be circulated and hopefully signed
by every citizen concerned with this issue. No need for any
designation other than US citizen is necessary to begin the process. If
Holder and Taylor refuse to bring the motion on their own volition,
the petition will be necessary for the next stage.
I can’t help but
be skeptical
about the likelihood of success as to any of these possibilities.
However, now that Obama is in office as POTUS, Quo Warranto is
virtually tailor made as the proper legal device available for
justice. Furthermore, I would think that President Obama would
like
the chance to have his title to POTUS clear for the sake of history and
for the sanity of the nation.
An action in Quo
Warranto should ask for two simple issues to be resolved:
1.
That a court determine whether
Obama’s birth status having been governed by the British Nationality
Act of 1948 prevents him from eligibility as a natural born citizen
under Article 2, Section 1, Clause 5 of the US Constitution.
2.
That Obama produce his long form birth certificate to AG Holder and/or
US Attorney Taylor.
There is an
important public policy consideration for this to
happen. We have identified various cases which lay the groundwork for
tens of thousands of potential plaintiffs to institute law suits to
challenge various laws and orders signed by Obama based upon claims of
POTUS ineligibility. And standing for such cases has not been held to
be as stringent as an action in Quo Warranto. Only a month in office
and we are already seeing signs of this floodgate being opened.
Furthermore,
some military have already been subjected to potential
court martial charges by ill advised public statements and reckless
insinuation in the press that Presidential orders were defied.
While it may
appear at first glance that soldiers have proper
standing for an action in Quo Warranto, the relevant statutes and cases
do not stand for that proposition. As you will see from the pending
legal research, standing issues are hard to overcome and one would have
to stretch the relevant case laws to make Quo Warranto standing work
for military plaintiffs.
The military may
have standing to challenge individual actions or
orders, but such suits are not in the nature of quo warranto even
though they might be based on ineligibility of Obama for POTUS. And
any such action is probably better suited to military courts/tribunals
etc. Such suits are “collateral” attacks on eligibility whereas
actions in quo warranto are “direct” attacks. I will break down
the
relevant case law which explains these nuances.
Regardless,
military
involvement isn’t necessary as we have identified a subset of
plaintiffs who SCOTUS has directly made reference to for Quo Warranto
standing. Soldiers are not part of this subset. Furthermore, the
fact
that a growing group of soldiers may have already subjected themselves
to possible court martial by taking part in POTUS eligibility suits and
PR campaigns thereto provides a greater force to the public policy
interest inherent in the need for AG Holder and US Attorney Taylor to
take the reigns and follow the statute written just for the purpose of
settling this dispute.
If you are an
active military
person who is thinking of joining an action in Quo Warranto, please
refrain form doing so until you have read the pending brief I will
publish here.
Attorney Apuzzo
and I will be working together on this public
awareness campaign. I am very encouraged to have found another
attorney who lives near me and who I believe in. I was very impressed
by his intellect as to the various nuances of this intricate field of
law. I believe we will both learn from each other and together provide
a more powerful perspective and education to the public as well as
presenting the best possible pro bono legal action on behalf of any
potential plaintiffs.
Hopefully, such
a petition will not be necessary if AG holder and/or
US Attorney Taylor will step in and take the lead as is warranted by the
following statute:
§ 16-3501.
Persons against whom issued; civil action.
A quo
warranto may be issued from the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia in the name of the United States against a person
who within the District of Columbia usurps, intrudes into, or
unlawfully holds or exercises, a franchise conferred by the United
States or a public office of the United States, civil or military. The
proceedings shall be deemed a civil action.
§ 16-3502.
Parties who may institute; ex rel. proceedings.
The
Attorney General of the United States or the United States attorney may
institute a proceeding pursuant to this subchapter on his own motion or
on the relation of a third person. The writ may not be issued on the
relation of a third person except by leave of the court, to be applied
for by the relator, by a petition duly verified setting forth the
grounds of the application, or until the relator files a bond with
sufficient surety, to be approved by the clerk of the court, in such
penalty as the court prescribes, conditioned on the payment by him of
all costs incurred in the prosecution of the writ if costs are not
recovered from and paid by the defendant.
§ 16-3503.
Refusal of Attorney General or United States attorney to act; procedure.
If the Attorney
General or United States attorney refuses to institute a quo warranto
proceeding on the request of a person interested, the interested person
may apply to the court by certified petition for leave to have the writ
issued. When, in the opinion of the court, the reasons set forth in the
petition are sufficient in law, the writ shall be allowed to be issued
by any attorney, in the name of the United States, on the relation of
the interested person on his compliance with the condition prescribed
by section 16-3502 as to security for costs.
Posted in Uncategorized on March 5, 2009 by naturalborncitizen
[TYPO UPDATE:
The first federal Quo Warranto statute was enacted in 1878 not 1787.]
[UPDATE 9:16 AM:
03.06.09: EXHIIBITS 7-9 were added below. And they are heavyweights.]
[UPDATE: 12:30
AM: 03.06.09 EXHIBIT 6 was added below . ]
The
issue of whether the President can be removed from
office other than by impeachment is the single most important question
presented with regard to challenging the eligibility of a sitting
President. This section of the brief contains important new information
supporting the conclusions discussed in Part 1 of this legal brief .
Please
understand that if the Constitution limits Congressional power to
remove the President to only cases of impeachment then there
is no Constitutional mechanism available to remove a
President who is proved to be a usurper. And if that’s true, then the
federal quo warranto statute doesn’t have the power to remove a sitting President… even if it was
proved beyond any doubt he was ineligible.
The best dream
team of lawyers you can draft may bring all the law
suits they like for the best possible reasons in favor of the most
perfectly possible plaintiffs with undeniable standing as to
injury in fact and causality, but the courts do not have the
authority - under the Constitution - to remove a sitting
President. Those law suits will fail and they should fail.
In order to
protect the Constitution, we must not subvert the separation
of powers.
If it can’t
be done by quo warranto, then it can’t be done at all. Why?
Because
Congress is the only branch authorized by the Constitution to remove
the President should he be found ineligible. And the only court
Congress has delegated that power to is the District Court of the
District of Columbia, and such delegation of power is strictly limited
to actions governed by the federal quo warranto statute.
If we are going
to challenge eligibility to protect the
Constitution, then we certainly cannot do an end around the separation
of powers. I have recognized this from the outset and that’s why
I
tried to have the eligibility issue litigated prior to election day and
then again prior to the electoral college meeting. After the electoral
college met and cast its votes for Obama, he went from being an
ordinary candidate to being the President-elect.
That
metamorphosis has important Constitutional consequences which
cannot be ignored. The Constitution provides that once we have a
President-elect, the eligibility of that person can be challenged by
Congress. The political question doctrine kicks in at that
point and the ability of any other branch to challenge for POTUS
eligibility is probably nullified. And once the President-elect is
sworn in and assumes office, the Constitutional separation of powers certainly controls the
issue.
Recall, Congress didn’t challenge Obama’s eligibility
before he was sworn in, so those provisions are now moot. And
once a
person is sworn in as President, the Constitution then provides
specific means for removing the President from office, none of which grant such power to the Judicial Branch. Now please
consider the following two points:
1.
Nowhere in the Constitution does it give the Judicial Branch the power
to remove a sitting President.
Those who are
currently petitioning the Judicial branch to challenge
Presidential eligibility are seeking to subvert the Constitution.
They will argue
Obama isn’t legally President and so
therefore the Constitutional separation of powers can be ignored.
Should a court ever accept that theory, you will have the recipe for
civil war, and you will be doing more damage to the nation than you can
even imagine. Protest all you like, but the US Government
recognizes
his authority.
Furthermore,
United States Courts all the way up to SCOTUS have refused to get
involved, and this was the case before Obama was sworn in
when the Judicial Branch actually did have the power to
adjudicate the eligibility issue. They punted. Fact.
Now that Obama
has taken the office of President and is officially
recognized as President, no court is going to suddenly take a leap
around the separation of powers by agreeing the Constitution doesn’t
apply to Obama as President. That will never happen.
Let that sink in
because it’s true.
2.
Nowhere in the Constitution does it say that impeachment is the sole
means of removing the President.
Some who support
Obama’s eligibility will seek to subvert the
Constitution by arguing that the Constitution states that the sole
remedy for removing the President is impeachment. Nowhere in the Document does it
say that. Those who believe it must “imply” or “assume” that is the case. But
the Constitution does not state that impeachment is the sole means of
removing the President.
The Constitution does say that Congress has the sole authority to impeach and the Senate to convict, and that the President “shall” be removed
upon conviction, but it does not say that impeachment is the sole
means of removal. You will hear people say that it does say that
in the days ahead. It is a lie.
I have uncovered
a plethora of evidence - within and without the
Constitution - which I strongly believe proves that the framers
provided Congress with the power to remove a President who is found to
be ineligible. This makes sense because not every person who is found
to be ineligible is guilty of a crime.
HYPOTHETICAL:
Two
double agents born in the evil
nation of “KILLAMERICASTAN” sneak a child into America over the
Canadian border and later obtain false documents indicating they are US
citizens and that their child was born in the United States. The child
is raised like a Manchurian Candidate and believes his parents are US
citizens and that he was born in the US. The child grows up a gifted
politician and eventually becomes President. After being sworn
in, the
truth is discovered by US Intelligence and proved beyond any
doubt.
The President then refuses to leave office since he didn’t do anything
wrong and had no knowledge of the plot.
What happens?
Well, the
President has done nothing to be impeached. He’s not
guilty of any high crimes or misdemeanors, bribery or treason.
Did the
framers leave us naked in such a situation? I don’t believe so. We
will return to this shortly.
SEPARATION OF
POWERS
My respect for
the separation of powers in our Constitution is the
core reason I was so willing to drop the eligibility fight once the
Electoral College met. I
understand and respect the Constitution. And I would never further damage it by aiding a new Constitutional crisis which might
help to bring our Republic down.
We must respect
the separation of powers or we will lose the Constitution and the
Republic for which it stands.
The separation
of powers argument will be the proper undoing of every single POTUS eligibility law suit running through the
courts at this moment in time. They will all fail. And they
should,
because for any of them to prevail, the separation of powers would be
violated.
Even in law
suits where federal courts have been petitioned to
request Congress investigate - by way of mandamus - Obama’s
eligibility (as opposed to seeking removal), the courts will dismiss on
the basis of separation of powers limitations and/or subject matter
jurisdiction, even if the plaintiffs were found to have passed the
difficult standing tests (and that’s not going to happen either).
While I respect
the litigants and the efforts they have made, I take
issue with some of the tactics employed and I’m also not that impressed
with many of the pleadings. I hope that, by publishing this brief, I
will correct some of the previous errors and provide the public at
large with the best possible education so that proper pressure can be
applied to authorized Government officials. Knowledge is power. I
seek to empower you.
Should those
officials not respond, I also hope the following will
act as a template for any attorneys who may wish to pursue a quo
warranto petition. This should save time and resources.
I have reached
out to some of the attorneys who impressed me, but none have
brought a law suit which can succeed in light of the separation of
powers enumerated in the Constitution.
IS THERE A
CONSTITUTIONAL SOLUTION?
It appears there is a Constitutionally viable method available for the
eligibility issue to be litigated which does not violate the
separation of powers enumerated in the Constitution. I strongly believe
the federal quo
warranto statute provides the only Constitutionally viable means by which a sitting President can be
removed from office if found to be a usurper, whether such usurpation
is intentional or unintentional. Full details and analysis below,
but
first let’s discuss the following:
REVIEW OF
CURRENT QUO WARRANTO ACTIVITY
As far as I can
tell, only one attorney has filed for an actual quo
warranto claim at this point in time. Unfortunately, that attempt
will
fail as it was brought on behalf of private plaintiffs. As you will
see below, any action in quo warranto must be brought on behalf of the
United States. The attorney needed to first petition the Attorney
General or US Attorney in DC to institute an action in quo
warranto.
Additionally, that same action was brought in the wrong venue.
According to the statute, a quo warranto action to challenge the
eligibility of a United States officer - whether elected or appointed -
can only be brought in the District Court of the District of
Columbia.
Another attorney
has sent a “pre-litigation” letter to Attorney General Holder.
But the
statute requires a “verified petition” be forwarded to the Attorney
General and/or the US Attorney requesting consent plaintiffs be allowed to institute a
quo warranto action in the name of the United States. No such petition
has been filed.
This “letter”
sent to AG Holder insists he recuse himself due to an
alleged conflict of interest since the Attorney General’s office is the
designated defender of the President. But that is only true as to the
President’s official actions. A Quo warranto dispute is not related to official activity of the President’s office. It
relates to
whether the President is eligible to hold the office and that is not an
“official action” undertaken by the President. The statute defines quo
warranto as a civil action. I believe the President would have to
hire
private counsel to defend him.
So, there’s
probably no legal conflict of interest requiring Eric
Holder to recuse himself. Any conflict of interest which exists is
probably limited to the personal gratitude AG Holder may have for Obama
since he appointed him. But that’s not the type of
conflict
which requires recusal. For example, a Supreme Court Justice does not
have to recuse himself in a dispute involving the President who
appointed him.
It’s not fair to
suggest AG holder won’t do his job because he owes
personal allegiance to Obama. I believe in fighting a fair fight even
if others fight unfairly against me. It’s only fair that the man be
given the chance to do the right thing. Furthermore, no verified
petition has even been forwarded to the Attorney General’s office.
The federal quo
warranto statute provides that the “United States attorney” may institute an action in quo
warranto on his own motion. The US Attorney for the District of
Columbia is Jeffrey Taylor.
He was appointed to that position in 2006 by the Bush administration
and certainly has no conflict of interest. I am not aware of anybody
who has contacted US Attorney Taylor in this regard. It will only take one of those officials to bring the action, not both.
WHY EVERY EFFORT
SHOULD BE
MADE BY THE PUBLIC TO PRESSURE AG HOLDER AND US ATTORNEY TAYLOR TO
INSTITUTE - ON THEIR OWN MOTION - AN ACTION IN QUO WARRANTO ON BEHALF
OF THE UNITED STATES WITHOUT EX RELATOR PLAINTIFFS
While arguments
about whether the military make the best plaintiffs
have been raging, the simple truth is that a quo warranto case with the
best chance of success ought to be initiated with no private plaintiffs
at all. The federal quo warranto statute shows a preference for cases
brought on behalf of the United States by the Attorney General or the
US Attorney. And until respectful pressure is applied to
those officials, the nation is deprived of the most perfect avenue to
justice. Until this course of action is exhausted, I pray that all
private attorneys briefly delay requesting consent from these
officials while an effort is made to persuade them that it’s in the
best interests of the nation for them to proceed on their own motion.
This is
not a private issue. The controversy is raging.
Nobody can deny that. AG Holder and US Attorney Taylor need to
consider that the citizens, the military, the Government - as well
as Obama himself - will all be better off once clear title to the
office is established.
§
16-3502. Parties who may institute; ex rel. proceedings.
The Attorney General of
the United States or the United States attorney may institute a
proceeding pursuant to this subchapter on his own motion or on the
relation of a third person. The
writ may not be issued on the relation of a third person except by
leave of the court, to be applied for by the relator, by a
petition duly verified setting forth the grounds of the application…
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In Newman v.
United States ex Rel. Frizzell, 238 U.S. 537 at 546 (1915), the
Supreme Court interpreted the role of the AG and US attorney as follows:
If
either official bring an action in quo warranto upon
their own motion, such an action is brought on behalf of the United
States and no leave of the court is necessary.
Comparatively,
if a private attorney petitions these officials to
allow them to bring suit in the name of the US “ex relator” then even
if one of the two officials gives their consent, leave of the court must be requested and if denied, that’s it. The matter is done. One could
then appeal to SCOTUS, but SCOTUS is the last resort, not the first.
There’s no need to disrespect the statute and the resources of the
court by going straight to SCOTUS. That’s just sensational,
not wise.
Another
interesting point to consider is that while the predecessor
statute only named the District Attorney for the District of Columbia -
the modern statute which controls quo warranto as to national officers
mentions both the Attorney General and the “United States
attorney”.
As written, it’s possible any US attorney might be eligible
to institute such a quo warranto action. Notice that in the
statute -
“attorney” isn’t capitalized in either 16-3502
or 16-3503 when the “United States attorney” is mentioned. Of course, US Attorney
Taylor is certainly authorized, but this needs further research.
Assuming AG
Holder or US Attorney Taylor were to institute an action
in quo warranto, the District Court might attempt to avoid a hearing on
the merits (which every court of the nation seems hell bent upon
avoiding) by claiming that the federal quo warranto statute - if
applied to the President - would violate the Constitutional separation
of powers and that they are of the opinion that the Constitution only
allows removal of the President for impeachment.
If that argument
can be overcome then, due to the obvious public
policy benefits inherent in establishing that the President has a clear
title to the office of President, there should be no obstacle
preventing at least one of the two officials charged with the authority
to act in the name of the United States to bring this issue to the
court for the benefit of the nation.
THE CONSTITUTION
HAS PROVIDED CONGRESS WITH THE AUTHORITY TO REMOVE THE PRESIDENT FROM
OFFICE IN CASES OTHER THAN IMPEACHMENT.
Evidence of this
power is directly written into the Constitution.
The most obvious section is Article 2, Section 1, Clause 6 which states
in full:
In
Case of the Removal of the
President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to
discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall
devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for
the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the
President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as
President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability
be removed, or a President shall be elected.
Unlike in Wikipedia, the
actual text of the Constitution does not apply the heading “Vacancy and
Disability”. The heading is misleading. A comprehensive
investigation
appears to reveal that the framers intended Article 2, Section 1,
Clause 6 - as it applied to the POTUS - for two distinct purposes.
- the first
purpose is the commonly accepted purpose: to provide for a vacancy in
the office of President
- the second
purpose was to provide Congress a means to remove the
President should it become clear that he is not entitled to hold the
office, for example - a classic quo warranto situation or if the
President becomes disabled.
I realize this
is an entirely new theory of Constitutional law and
that the common accepted interpretation is that the President can only
be removed by impeachment. As stated above, the Constitution does not state anywhere in its text that impeachment is the only means by which the President can be removed. And since the concept of
demanding public officials prove their legal warrant to hold office via
the extraordinary writ of quo warranto goes back to feudal times,
nobody can deny the framers were aware that usurpation was a sad fact
of life.
How likely is it
that the Framers failed to provide for usurpation
of public office in the Constitution? Knowing their collective wisdom,
not very likely. So please suspend judgment until the full weight of
the evidence is revealed.
EVIDENCE THE
FRAMERS INTENDED TO PROVIDE FOR REMOVAL OF THE PRESIDENT BY QUO
WARRANTO - SUCH POWER VESTED IN CONGRESS
If my theory is
correct, then we should be looking for evidence that
the Framers considered - in their deliberations upon Article 2, Section
1, Clause 6 - that impeachment was not the sole means of ousting a
sitting President. The following are my list of exhibits.
EXHIBIT 1: A perfect on
point reference from James Madison’s personal notes are included in the Records
Of the Federal Convention:
In
Case of his Impeachment,
(Dismission) Removal, Death, Resignation or Disability to discharge the
Powers and Duties of his (Department) Office; the President of the
Senate shall exercise those Powers and Duties, until another President
of the United States be chosen, or until the President impeached or
disabled be acquitted, or his Disability be removed.
[2:186;
Madison, 6 Aug.]
James Madison’s
notes here pertain directly to Clause 6 and they list - separated by commas - all the various possibilities whereby the President’s office might be
vacated. Clearly, they considered that the Presidency might be vacated
by a “Case of Impeachment” as well as “(Dismission)
Removal, Death, Resignation, or Disability“.
Impeachment
and Dismission are listed as mutually exclusive devices to remove the
President.
EXHIBIT 2: Clause 6 directly follows the infamous Article 2, Section 1, Clause 5
wherein the exact qualifications for the office of President are listed.
Qualifications
for office are directly followed by a clause empowering removal from
office.
EXHIBIT 3: The
text of Article 2, Section 1, Clause 6 would be redundant unless the
dual purposes listed above were intended.
Examine the
first part of Clause 6 alone:
In
Case of the Removal of the
President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to
discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall
devolve on the Vice President,…
If the sole
intention of the framers was that Clause 6 only applied
- as to the POTUS - with regard to replacing a vacancy then there was
no need to say anymore about it - as to the President. The first line
indicates that the powers devolve upon the Vice President when a
vacancy occurs. So what’s the need for the next line?
…and
the Congress may by Law provide
for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the
President and Vice President,…
In this line we
see that the Framers, who in the first line already
provided directly for succession as to the President, have given
Congress - in the 2nd line - the authority to “by Law provide for the
Case of Removal… ” of the President and Vice President.
Now, let’s
examine the third line:
…declaring
what Officer shall then
act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the
Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.
Without the bias
of pre-conceived notions, a balanced reading of
Clause 6 indicates that the Framers intended to give Congress the
authority to remove the President as long as the manner in which they
do that is provided for “by law” in line 2. Then in line 3, the
Framers charged Congress to provide for a line of succession should the
Presidency be vacated… as well as the Vice Presidency, and so on.
If there was
only one purpose, why mention the vacancy of the Presidency twice?
EXHIBIT 4: The
25th Amendment.
One of the
arguments against my theory is the misconception that the 25th
Amendment superseded every purpose of Clause 6. I don’t believe that’s correct. The
25th
amendment was born directly due to the clunky ambiguities contained in
Article 2 Section 1 Clause 6. And the 25th Amendment response to
that
wording directly attests that the Congressional power vested
by Clause 6 was not just concerned with providing for a
vacancy since the 25th Amendment also provides specific means by which
Congress can force the
President to leave office, temporarily and/or permanently:
Whenever
the Vice President and a
majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments
or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the
powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
If Clause 6 only
grants Congress the power of providing for a
vacancy, then why does the 25th Amendment provide Congress the ability
to “by law provide” (the same language as used in Clause 6 as to
“removal”) some “other body” the right to declare the President
unable
to discharge his duties?
Clearly, if the
25th Amendment was simply a clarification of Clause 6, then Clause 6
must have vested Congress with more power than just the power to provide for succession since the 25th Amendment
allows Congress to replace the President with the Vice President.
Whether the
President was found undeniably ineligible to be
President - due to his not being a natural born citizen - would make
him unable to discharge his duties is certainly debatable, but I don’t
think the 25th Amendment pertains to that fact pattern since Clause 6
and Madison’s notes both list “Removal” and “inability to discharge the
Power and Duties” as mutually exclusive. It would be disingenuous to
argue that the 25th Amendment directly pertains to a quo warranto
situation.
However, it’s
obvious that if the 25th Amendment is a response to
the ambiguity of Clause 6, then Clause 6 wasn’t just intended to
fulfill vacancies. If Congress was given power in Clause 6 (as
codified by the 25th Amendment) to actually replace the President upon his inability to discharge duties - then Congress
also had the power to remove the President for being found ineligible.
The 25th
Amendment is quite
an amazing grant of power when you consider the President can be forced
to step down if Congress believes he’s lost his mind.
That’s certainly a much greater power than just being authorized to
decide how to fill the vacancy if he loses his mind.
More evidence to
support my theory is found in what the the 25th Amendment doesn’t discuss.
The 25th
Amendment doesn’t discuss death or resignation.
Why?
Because there is
nothing to discuss. When the President dies or
resigns has nothing to do with Congress. But when it came to
deciding
whether the President is able to discharge his duties, Congress is
authorized to exercise removal power by the 25th Amendment - and such
power must be derived directly from Article 2 Section 1 Clause 6.
QUESTION: If
Congress has the power to remove a President should it become known he
was a usurper, then why doesn’t the 25th Amendment address that?
ANSWER: Because
by 1967 - when the 25th Amendment was ratified - Congress had already
exercised their authority on this issue by enacting the federal quo
warranto statute which allows for the removal of any United States
officer found to be a usurper.
EXHIBIT 5: Article 2 Section 4:
The
President, Vice President and
all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office
on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other High
crimes and misdemeanors.
If
one argues that the federal quo warranto
statute does not apply to the President because the only way to remove
a President is by impeachment, then it stands to reason that the
statute also can not apply to “civil officers of the United
States”.
If you’re going to argue that Article 2 section 4 is the sole means of
removing the President, then you must also argue that it’s the sole
means of removing “civil officers of the United States”.
If that’s your
argument, then 16-3501 of the federal quo warranto statute makes absolutely no sense. Take a
look:
A
quo warranto may be issued from the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia in the name of the United States against a person who within the District of Columbia usurps, intrudes into, or
unlawfully holds or exercises, a franchise conferred by the United
States or a public office of
the United States, civil or military. The proceedings shall be
deemed a civil action. (Emphasis added.)
If Congress
didn’t believe they had the authority to remove a usurper from any public office of the United States, they why did they enact the statute
to to read as if it covers every public office of the United States?
Why didn’t they write relevant exceptions in the statute for the office
of President, Vice President and civil officers?
The 25th
Amendment clarified “Article 2 Section 1 Clause 6″ only in
so far as the clause needed clarification. It didn’t need
clarification as to death or resignation of the President as those are
obvious, and it didn’t need clarification as to issues of quo warranto
and usurpers because they had enacted a thorough federal statute.
EXHIBIT 6: Article
1 Section 8 Clause 17 - aka “The Hook Clause”
Article 1
Section 8 Clause17 states:
The
Congress shall have power…To exercise exclusive
legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular
states, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the
government of the United States,…
Compare the
wording of Clause 17 with §16-3501 of
the federal quo warranto statute:
A
quo warranto may be issued from the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia in the name of the United States against a
person who within the
District of Columbia usurps,
intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises, a franchise conferred
by the United States or a public office of the United States, civil or
military. The proceedings shall be deemed a civil action.
When you read
the two back to back, it appears Constitutional that
the office of President - being in the District of Columbia - should be
governed by the federal quo warranto statute.
EXHIBIT 7: Analogous
Congressional precedent - the voiding of “Mr. Shields” and “Mr.
Galatin’s” US Senate elections after they were found to be
usurpers who did not meet the qualifications for office enumerated in
the Constitution.
While the
Constitution doesn’t provide for impeachment of Senators
or Representatives, it does provide for their “expulsion” by a vote of
two thirds of all members of each body respectively. Article
1 Section 5 states:
Each
House may determine the rules
of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and,
with the concurrence of two thirds, expel a member.
Like impeachment
for a President, expulsion is sometimes erroneously
assumed to be the only Constitutional process by which a Senator can be
removed from office. But that’s not accurate. The Senate can
remove a
sitting Senator should he be found to be a usurper, just as they can
remove a President found to be a usurper… and they have done so at
least twice that I am aware of.
At Senate.gov,
all fifteen of the Senators who have been removed by the
Constitutionally enumerated process of expulsion are listed. Please
notice that the list doesn’t include Senator Shields who was removed by Congress in 1849.
Senator Shields
was removed by the Senate after it was discovered
that he was an alien by birth, and that when he was elected in January
1849 - from the State of Illinois, to serve as a US Senator - he had
not been a US citizen for the requisite nine years. However, he was
not removed pursuant to the Article 1 section 5 expulsion power.
Instead, the
Senate held that his election was entirely “void”.
Senator Shields even offered his resignation to the Senate, but his
resignation was not accepted by the Senate who held that since Shields
was never qualified, he was never a Senator even though he
had been sworn in and had been serving as a Senator until March 1849
when his election was completely made void and the seat declared vacant.
Since
Shields it was discovered - after Shields had occupied
the Senate seat - that he didn’t meet the Constitutional qualifications
for the office of Senate, the Senate held that he was never an actual
Senator and so his removal is not recorded as an expulsion.
Nowhere in the
Constitution does it explicitly state that the Senate
may remove a Senator by making a determination that his election was
void and that he was a usurper. But that’s exactly what happened.
If
the power to remove a usurper wasn’t Constitutionally allowed, the
Senate couldn’t have voided Mr. Shields election and vacated his Senate
seat. But they did.
The Congressional
Globe account of the Shields removal is preceded by an account of a similar precedent regarding a
Mr. Albert Galatin. Mr. Galatin was elected to the US Senate from
Pennsylvania in 1793 and it was later found that he had never become
naturalized. The Senate again voided his election stating that the
election wasn’t just “voidable”, but that since there was no way to
cure the qualification defect… the election was completely “void”… it
didn’t happen.
It’s important
to note that the first quo warranto statue enacted by Congress didn’t
take effect until 1787 [typo - that
should read "1878"] so in 1793 and 1849 the Senate chose to void the
elections of the two usurpers.
So here we have
precedent for Congressional authority to remove
Senators other than by expulsion. Usurpation of office resulted in
elections being voided and the Senate record do not even record
usurpers as having been members of the Senate. If Congress can remove
a usurper to the Senate without expelling him, this provides evidence
that Congress can remove a usurper to the Presidency without impeaching
him.
It appears there
is no possible separation of powers issue to
confront. If a person occupying the Presidency is found to be a
usurper, then his Presidency is a fiction to be voided in history and
his name removed from the record books. A usurper isn’t allowed to
have been said to be President. His occupation is a fiction.
In the Galatin
case the Senate made clear that since there was no
possible way the failure to qualify could be cured, then the election
was a total fiction and is void, not voidable, but void, as if it never
happened.
[Special thanks
to reader Kamira, who discovered this information in the Congressional Globe.]
EXHIBIT 8: USC CODE: TITLE 3 THE PRESIDENT Chapter 1. Presidential Elections and
Vacancies
Please
review §19:
Vacancy
in offices of both president and vice president; officers eligible to
act
§
19. (a) (1) If, by reason of
death, resignation, removal from office, inability, or failure to
qualify, there is neither a President nor Vice President to discharge
the powers and duties of the office of President, then the Speaker of
the House of Representatives shall, upon his resignation as Speaker and
as Representative in Congress, act as President.
Please take
notice that “failure to qualify” is listed as one of the
means by which a vacancy in the office of President may occur.
And
recall, as to Mr. Shields whose election to the Senate was voided, the
Senate declared his seat vacant.
EXHIBIT 9: COMMON SENSE
Out of all the
exhibits listed above, I think it’s most important to keep in mind the
most simple evidence - common sense.
Does anybody really believe our Constitution prevents the removal of a
person who is found to be a usurper to the office of President?
The answer must be no.
CONCLUSION: The
federal quo warranto statute provides the only Constitutional means by
which a sitting President may be removed by the Judicial branch.
(I must thank a
special reader for making me aware of the Clause 17 hook.)
[To be continued
in part 3.]
Posted in Uncategorized on March 10, 2009 by naturalborncitizen
[CORRECTIONS struck out below and in purple. 03.11.09]
——————————————————————————————–
The following points contain the most important issues as to federal
quo warranto actions brought under the District of Columbia Code.
1. SCOTUS IS THE WRONG VENUE TO INITIATE AN ACTION IN QUO WARRANTO BECAUSE DOING
SO WOULD DEPRIVE THE PUBLIC OF A JURY TRIAL ON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER
OBAMA WAS BORN IN HAWAII.
The District of Columbia Code, Title 16, Chapter 35 (Quo Warranto)
Subchapter III states:
§ 16-3544.
Pleading; jury trial.
In a quo warranto
proceeding, the defendant may demur, plead specially, or plead “not
guilty” as the general issue, and the United States or the District of
Columbia, as the case may be, may reply as in other actions of a civil
character. Issues of fact shall be tried by a jury if either party
requests it. Otherwise they shall be determined by the court. (Emphasis
added.)
The quo warranto statute allows a jury trial on “issues of
fact”. Whether Obama was born in Hawaii is an issue of fact.
Whoever
institutes a proceeding pursuant to the statute may request a jury
trial and one must be granted. The judge could not
refuse.
But if the case is brought to SCOTUS before it’s brought to
the District Court of the District of Columbia, and if SCOTUS were to
accept the case, you’re never going to have a jury trial.
Any quo warranto proceeding should go before the DC District Court
as follows:
a. a determination would have to be made, as a matter of fact,
as to whether Obama was born in the US/Hawaii.
b. if the jury’s verdict is
that he wasn’t born in Hawaii, then the legal question is easy: he’s
not a natural born citizen. please take note that the issue
wouldn’t
be whether the online COLB is genuine, the issue is whether Obama was
born in Hawaii and any COLB or other document would only be considered
as a piece of evidence for the jury to consider.
c. if the jury’s verdict is
that Obama was born in Hawaii, then the next issue is a more complex
judicial question. The District Court would have to make a legal
determination as to the meaning of NATURAL BORN CITIZEN.
Congress has absolutely no power to “interpret” clauses of the
Constitution. That would be a violation of the separation of
powers.
Only the judicial branch could make such a determination. Congress
properly assigned the issue to the District Court.
While Congress has the power to remove the President under
the Constitution, they don’t have the power to interpret the
Constitution. The judicial branch must do that.
As to issues of fact, ie:
- how long a person is a citizen of the US
- how old a person is
- where a person is born
…these qualifications for office are matters of fact which
Congress properly recognized were best left to a trier of fact and
therefore a trial by jury is statutorily allowed.
The issue of who is a “natural born citizen” under Article 2 Section
1 Clause 5 is an issue of legal interpretation outside the
Constitutional authority of Congress.
Only the judicial branch can interpret the laws of this
nation.
Congress didn’t delegate the authority to remove the
President…they exercised that authority. (My previous explanation was not correct. I
said they
delegated their authority but that was a poor choice of words.
Please
forgive me.) Congress exercised their authority by
allowing for the removal of the President.
Under the statute, the DC District Court must follow the law
enacted by Congress. Congress has deemed that if an action is
instituted properly, the court then conducts a trial as to all relevant
facts. After the facts are determined, the court is empowered
under
the Constitution, to interpret the law in light of the facts.
JURY TRIAL. Think about that.
SCOTUS is not a trier of fact and so quo warranto MUST be brought
before the District Court for the District of Columbia EXACTLY as the
statute requires.
GOD FORBID SCOTUS WOULD
EVER JUMP IN AND TRY TO WRANGLE THIS CASE FROM A DISTRICT COURT JURY.
2. STANDING UNDER THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CODE TO INSTITUTE A
FEDERAL QUO WARRANTO ACTION
a. STANDING OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
The DC code allows three different levels of standing to “institute”
a quo warranto action. As to private plaintiffs, SCOTUS noted - in Newman at 538 - that Congress “has placed obstacles” in the way. But as to the
“Attorney General” or the “United States attorney”, who act in the name
of the United States, the statute makes it very simple for an action to
be instituted. It says:
“The
Attorney General of the United States or the United States attorney may
institute a proceeding pursuant to this subchapter on his own motion…”
SCOTUS in Newman
at 546 has interpreted the statute to give wide discretion to these
officials:
- There is no qualification that the officials must consider public
opinion or political party affiliation.
- There is no “standing” to prove. If your title is US Attorney
General or United States attorney, you have standing.
- There is no need to consult with Congress because, as SCOTUS noted
in their opinion, Congress has already acted on the issue by enacting
the quo warranto statute.
All that is required is that the official deems a quo warranto
statute proper. His discretion is unassailable judicially.
WHY SHOULD THESE OFFICIALS DEEM QUO WARRANTO PROPER?
The short answer is that
the action is proper to settle title to the office of President for the
good of the nation.
Even if both officials are convinced Obama is eligible, it’s still
proper for them institute a quo warranto proceeding because the
evidence emerging now is that, by leaving the controversy as is, a
floodgate of litigation will ensue. And like the waters over New
Orleans levees, this floodgate has the ability to wreak havoc on our
nation.
- Active military officers have openly stated that the so called
Commander In Chief is an “imposter” and a “usurper”. These men have
consented to be plaintiffs in eligibility law suits. Should this
trend
spread, it has the power to divide our forces and nation.
- Under the holding in ANDRADE
v. LAUER, 729 F.2d 1475, 234 U.S.App.D.C. 384 (1984),
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has held that the
defacto officer’s doctrine does not prohibit “collateral attacks” of
official actions based upon a public officer’s lack of
eligibility.
These are not quo warranto suits to remove the official, they are civil
suits to challenge a specific action of that official.
In the Andrade case, the plaintiffs were Government employees who
lost their jobs to “reduction in force” ordinances which cut whole
departments from the Government budget. The plaintiffs sued
alleging
those who did the cutting were not Constitutionally qualified to make
such decisions in that their appointments violated the appointments
clause of the US Constitution.
The DC District Court held that the plaintiffs had no standing other
than to bring a “direct attack” in quo warranto to remove the alleged
usurper. But the DC Court of Appeals reversed and said the
plaintiffs,
who had suffered real injuries, could bring such an action on a case by
case basis if they could prove their injury in fact (being fired) was
caused by a Government official who was not eligible to serve.
They opened the door to a floodgate of litigation by an incredibly
large field of possible plaintiffs who might challenge every single
official action of the Obama administration on the basis that he isn’t
eligible.
- Furthermore, there is a tenet of Government that requires there be
a certainty to the official actions taken in the name of the United
States. No certainty is possible when millions of US citizens,
including active military, are concerned that Obama’s credentials were
not verified in the same way all citizens must verify their identity
for the most simple things in life like getting a drivers license or
passport. It smacks of imperial coronation when a Government of,
by
and for the people are not entitled to know that the commander in chief
must submit to the same levels of identity proof as the citizens.
Regardless of whether one believes Obama’s online COLB is real, no
citizen can tell the Government to check a web site for their birth
certificate rather than bring it in to the DMV or send it to the
federal Government for a passport. You have to actually mail your BC
in to them if you don’t bring it in person.
I recognize that the Constitution does not require a birth
certificate as a qualification, but that’s not the issue anymore.
The issue is whether the
Attorney General and/or a United States attorney deems it proper for
Obama to provide the same proof of identity as ordinary citizens in
order to avoid FORESEEABLE complications which are destined to rot
public faith.
We need to put aside whatever prejudices we have as to the
eligibility and plead for now for the issue to be resolved as opposed
to pleading what we believe the outcome of any such action should be.
I have stated over and again on numerous radio programs that I do
not believe any private plaintiff has standing to demand to see Obama’s
records of birth or any other personal records. These plaintiffs
are
appealing to emotions and not rational legal considerations. Obama
should not bend to the will of those who have no legal authority to
command him. I said this over and over and over again. But I was
grouped in with these other attorneys whose theories I take great issue
with.
We are governed by laws. And there is no law which allows a private
person to demand to see Obama’s birth certificate or college records.
It may seem like a good idea, but last time I checked the Constitution,
neither are required to be President.
However, the United States
attorney, the Attorney General and the District Court for the District
of Columbia do have authority to command Obama to prove his credentials. And
they
ought to exercise that authority for the good of the nation, especially
our military.
I fail to see any difficulty in establishing non-partisan compliance
with the SCOTUS holding in Newman that
these officials may bring a quo warranto if they simply “deem it
proper” to do so.
That decision is not subject to review.
There is a public policy behind this which makes alot of sense.
Obama ought to encourage these officials to institute an action in quo
warranto for the good of the nation and for the good of his own legacy.
IMPORTANT:
The
best possible candidates I can think of who should request the US
Attorney and/or the Attorney General to bring an action in quo warranto
on their own motion are Retired Military officers who understand the
absolute need for the President’s title to office not to be encumbered
by doubt. Retired military can band together to request that
these
Government attorneys “deem it proper” to protect the active military
from all of the swirling dangers their involvement in a political
action as to POTUS eligibility would bring. Such a request shows no
disrespect, but rather recognizes the actual risk now being taken by
soldiers getting involved with various law suits. The retired military
would not be making a case for or against Obama’s eligibility, but
rather they would simply be asking that the issue be resolved one way
or the other under the applicable statute. Again, keep in mind that
the statute doesn’t require anything more than that the US attorney or
the Attorney General “deem it proper.”
Please don’t confuse this with asking these retired military to be
plaintiffs. That’s not what I’m suggesting. I’m suggesting that
retired military officers are the best possible group who might be able
to influence the US attorney or the Attorney General in making the
decision to bring an action in quo warranto on their own motion with no private plaintiffs.
Another interesting
question is whether any of the 94 United States attorneys may
institute the proceeding in quo warranto…[Ed. I have
reconsidered the discussion on this issue and as of 03.011.2009 struck
it from the brief. 16-3502 applies exclusively to the US Attorney General and to the US
Attorney
for the District of Columbia. I believe that's the most accurate
intention of the statute.]
b. Standing of “third persons” vs “interested persons”.
16-3502 states:
The Attorney General of the United
States or the United States attorney may institute a proceeding
pursuant to this subchapter on his own motion or on the relation of a
third person.
16-3503 states:
If
the Attorney General or United States attorney refuses to institute a
quo warranto proceeding on the request of a person interested, the
interested person may apply to the court by certified petition for
leave to have the writ issued.
The terms “third person” and
“interested person” have been interpreted by SCOTUS in the Newman case as follows:
Considering the ancient policy of
the law and the restrictions imposed by the language of the Code, it is
evident that, in passing this statute, Congress used the words “third
person” in the sense of “any person,” and the phrase “person
interested” in the sense in which it so often occurs in the law…The
interest which will justify such a proceeding by a private individual
must be more than that of another taxpayer. It must be “an interest in
the office itself, and must be peculiar to the applicant”…The language
of the Code, supported by the history and policy of the law, sustains
the proposition that one who has no interest except that which is
common to every other member of the public is not entitled to use the
name of the government in quo warranto proceedings.
For
if the allegations in such a suit by a private citizen set out any
cause of action at all, it shows on its face that it was a cause of
action belonging to the whole body of the public, and which therefore
should be prosecuted by the public representative.
The rule is the same regardless
whether the office is elective or appointive. For in neither case is
there any intent to permit the public office to be the subject matter
of private litigation at the instance of one who has no interest
therein which differs from that of every other member of the public.
The claim that this construction makes the statute nugatory cannot be
sustained, for the statute, as already pointed out, gives a person who
has been unlawfully ousted before his term expired a right, on proof of
interest, to the issuance of the writ, and there might be cases under
the civil service law in which the relator would have an interest and
therefore a right to be heard.
In Newman,
there was a jury trial and the jury held that the public officer didn’t
meet the requirements of office. The District Court ousted him based
on the jury’s verdict. The DC Court of Appeals affirmed. But
SCOTUS
reversed by stating the jury verdict was nullified because the
plaintiff wasn’t an “interested party” and so he didn’t have
standing.
Since the official Government attorneys refused consent to bring the
action, the plaintiff couldn’t just be a “third person”, the plaintiff
had to be an “interested person.”
SCOTUS held that interested persons would include persons ousted
from the office they are challenging. But they left the door open with
that last line, “…and there might be cases under the civil
service law in which the relator would have an interest and
therefore a right to be heard.” (Emphasis added.)
THREE WAYS TO BRING QUO WARRANTO
1. The US attorney
and/or the US Attorney General institute the case on their own motion -
which is the best way this could happen. No leave of the court need be
requested. There will be a hearing and a trial of facts.
2. If no authorized
Government attorneys will bring the action on their own motion, then
any citizen may join a law suit as “third persons” and such law suit,
by way of verified petition, shall be brought to the US Attorney and/or
the Attorney General to ask their consent to use the name of the United
States. If the Government gives consent, then you must request
permission from the court to bring the suit as well. And if the
Court
says yes, you will have a hearing on the merits.
3. If the
Government will not give consent, then “interested persons” may request
leave of the court to institute the action in quo warranto. But
standing will be - according to SCOTUS in Newman - restricted to
anybody who was ousted from the office of POTUS (and nobody is going to
meet that requirement) or, in the alternative there might by cases
under the civil service laws which provide standing.
I don’t know exactly what SCOTUS meant by that vague reference to
“civil service laws”, but I would assume they are making reference to
Government employees, and perhaps this could also apply to recipients
of civil service benefits. I don’t believe the military are party to
the civil service laws, so I don’t see them as being the plaintiffs
with the best possible standing.
The holding in Newman is certainly ripe for a challenge, but care
ought to be made to find the best possible plaintiffs who might qualify
as “interested persons”.
The best private plaintiffs who might have standing to institute an
action in quo warranto as “interested persons” would be
those persons
with an injury in fact caused by an official action of POTUS as it
relates to the civil service laws.
Active military may appear to have the best standing based on a
purely emotional reading of the term “interested persons”, but
according to the controlling SCOTUS decision in Newman, the
military aren’t the best subset of “third person” plaintiffs.
This is thes best shot, not the military. They do
enough
for us to at least deserve civilians with better standing exhaust every
possible Constitutional means available before subjecting them to any
number of possible court martials.
3. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE 16 CHAPTER 35 (Quo Warranto) OF THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CODE.
Chapter
35 is entitled “QUO WARRANTO”. Subchapter
I is entitled “Actions Against Officers of the United States.” Subchapter
II is entitled “Actions Against Officers or Corporations of the
District of Columbia“.
Please note that the original DC quo warranto statute was first enacted
in 1901. While SCOTUS interpreted that statute as controlling
national
officers, Congress modified the statute in 1963 to its current form
which erases any possible doubt that the statute applies to all
Officers of the United States.
Furthermore, the District of Columbia Code is federal law.
It’s enacted by Congress and the actual United
States Constitution is included in the District of Columbia code.
I have seen the most erroneous comments online wherein it has been
argued that a “local DC code is not federal law”. Besides the
ultimate
federal law - the Constitution - being placed directly in the DC code,
SCOTUS has stated - in the seminal quo warranto DC code case, Newman v.
United States ex Rel. Frizzell, 238 U.S. 537
(1915) - that the District Code applies to all…
I must reiterate that the code’s text does not provide any
exceptions for any public office, not even POTUS.
In UNITED STATES of America ex rel. STATE OF WISCONSIN v. FIRST
FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, 248
F.2d 804 (1957), the US court of Appeals, 7th Circuit, provided an
on point discussion of quo warranto in the district courts:
There have been submitted to this
court only two instances in which original quo
warranto jurisdiction has been specifically conferred upon federal
district courts. The revised statutes of 1878 vested jurisdiction in
these courts of proceedings brought by the United States Attorney for
the removal of persons holding office contrary to the Fourteenth
Amendment. Rev.Stat., Sections 563(14), 626(14), (1786). This Act was
repealed in the Judicial Code of 1911, 36 Stat. 1168. In 1901, Congress
specifically authorized the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia to issue quo warranto in the name of the
United States. Act of March 3, 1901, 31 Stat. 1419, Title 16, Section
1601 of the D.C. Code (1940). However, this grant is strictly limited
and is confined solely to situations involving franchises and public
offices held within the District of Columbia. There is no other
specific statutory provision vesting original jurisdiction in the
district courts in quo warranto actions.
The first statute mentioned above dealt specifically with quo
warranto actions which arose out of 14th amendment issues where
citizens were refused the right to vote. Under this statute, all
US
district courts could hear quo warranto cases. But this statute
was
repealed in 1911 and so the only remaining statute which controls quo
warranto is the District of Columbia Code. And all actions brought
thereunder must be brought in the District Court for the District of
Columbia.
All discussion of quo warranto actions brought in other “district
courts” of the US has been rendered moot Unfortunately, I have
seen
irrelevant analysis of that repealed statute applied to the DC Code by
various confused commentators online. In a quote taken from a
legal
treatise called Treatise
on Federal Practice by Roger Foster, written in 1921, he
states:
“The better opinion
is that the District Courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction to grant the writ of quo warranto only when specifically
authorized by statute; and that no writ of quo
warranto can issue from them to try the title to the office of President of the United States.”
At first glance it appears this “better opinion” might be a
problem. I don’t know where he derives this “better opinion” from,
certainly not the federal courts or SCOTUS because no such case law
exists. It’s probably a reflection of a common erroneous assumption
that the Constitution only allows removal of a sitting President by
impeachment in the House and conviction in the Senate. We put that
rumour to rest in part
2 of this brief – the Constitution does not say that
anywhere in the Document’s text.
When you continue with the Foster quote, it states:
The District Courts of the United States have jurisdiction of all suits
to recover possession of any office…authorized by law to be brought,
wherein it appears that the sole question touching
the title to such office arises out of
the denial of the right to vote to any citizen…” (Emphasis added.)
This analysis is specifically directed to the repealed statute
regarding quo warranto wherein “the sole issue”
is deprivation of 14th amendment voting rights. It has nothing to
do
with the District of Columbia Code wherein quo warranto may be brought
against any “public office of the United States” with regard
to anyone found to be a usurper for any legal breach.
The statute Foster refers to has been repealed. It didn’t deal
with
Constitutional qualifications for office. Also notice that the comment
says “District Courts”. This is obsolete. District Courts - other
than the DC district court - have been stripped of authority to hear
any quo warranto cases.
CONCLUSION: The District of Columbia Code is the only means by which a federal quo
warranto action can be instituted and its application is strictly
limited to public offices of the United States or local DC offices
within the ten square miles of the District of Columbia. No public
office, ie POTUS, is exempt by the statute.